Abstract. In the present work, a peculiar property of hash-based signatures allowing detection of their forgery event is explored. This property relies on the fact that a successful forgery of a hash-based signature most likely results in a collision with respect to the employed hash function, while the demonstration of this collision could serve as convincing evidence of the forgery. Here we prove that with properly adjusted parameters Lamport and Winternitz one-time signatures schemes could exhibit a forgery detection availability property. This property is of significant importance in the framework of crypto-agility paradigm since the considered forgery detection serves as an alarm that the employed cryptographic hash function becomes insecure to use and the corresponding scheme has to be replaced.
Introduction and problem statement
Today, cryptography is an essential tool for protecting the information of various kinds. A particular task that is important for modern society is to verify the authenticity of messages and documents in an effective manner. For this purpose, one can use so-called digital signatures. An elegant scheme for digital signatures is to employ one-way functions, which are one of the most important concepts for public-key cryptography. A crucial property of public-key cryptography based on one-way functions is that it provides a computationally simple algorithm for legitimate users (e.g. for key distribution or signing a document), whereas the problem for malicious agents is extremely computationally expensive. It should be noted that the very existence of one-way functions is still an open conjecture. Thus, the security of corresponding public-key cryptography tools is based on unproven assumptions about the computational facilities of malicious parties.
Assumptions on the security status of cryptographic tools may change with time. For example, breaking the RSA cryptographic scheme is as at least as hard as factoring large integers [1] . This task is believed to be extremely hard for classical computers, but it appeared to be solved in polynomial time with the use of a large-scale quantum computer using Shor's algorithm [2] . A full-scale quantum computer that is capable of launching Shor's algorithm for realistic RSA key sizes in a reasonable time is not yet created. At the same time, there are no identified fundamental obstacles that prevent from developing quantum computers of a required scale. Thus, prudent risk management requires defending against the possibility that attacks with quantum computers will be successful.
A solution for the threat of creating quantum computers is the development of a new type of cryptographic tools that strive to remain secure even under the assumption that the malicious agent has a large-scale quantum computer. This class of quantum-safe tools consists of two distinct methods [3] . The first is to replace public-key cryptography by quantum key distribution, which is a hardware solution based on transmitting information using individual quantum objects. The main advantage of this approach is that the security relies not on any computational assumptions, but on the laws of quantum physics [4] . However, quantum key distribution technologies today face a number of important challenges such as secret key rate, distance, cost, and practical security [5] .
Another way to guarantee the security of communications is to use so-called post-quantum (also known as quantum-resistant) algorithms, which use specific class of one-way functions that are believed to be hard to invert both using classical and quantum computers [6] . The main criticism of post-quantum cryptography is the fact that they are again based on computational assumptions so that there is no strict proof that they are long-term secure.
In our work, we consider a scenario, where an adversary finds a way to violate basic mathematical assumptions underlying the security of a particular cryptographic primitive. Thus, the adversary becomes able to perform successful attacks on information processing systems, which employ the vulnerable cryptographic primitive in their workflow. At the same time, it is in the interests of the adversary that the particular cryptographic primitive to be in use as long as possible since its replacement with some another one eliminates an obtained advantage. Thus, the preferable strategy of an attacker is to hide the fact of the breaking used cryptographic primitive. It can be realized by performing attacks in such a way that their success could be explained by some other factors (e.g. user negligence, hardware faults, and etc.), but the not the underlying cryptographic primitive. An illustrative example of such a strategy is hiding the information about the successes of the Enigma system cryptoanalysis during World War II.
Broadly speaking, the question we address in the present work is as follows: Is it possible to supply a new generation of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms with some kind of alarm indicating that they are broken? We argue that the answer on this question is partially positive, and the property, which we refer as a forgery detection availability, is inherent for properly designed hash-based signatures that are an important class of post-quantum digital signature algorithms [6] . Intuitively, a forgery of a hash-based signature most likely results in finding a collision with respect to the underlying cryptographic hash function (see Fig. 1 ). The demonstration of this collision can serve as convincing evidence of the forgery and corresponding vulnerability of the employed cryptographic hash function. We refer the mathematical scheme for the evidence of the forgery event as a proof-of-forgery concept. We would like to emphasize that some hash functions have been compromised after their publication [7] [8] [9] . Thus, the considered problem is of practical importance, rather than just purely academic.
In the present work, we illustrate the forgery detection availability property for Lamport [10, 11] and Winternitz [11] one-time signatures schemes. First, we consider the Lamport scheme, which is paradigmatically important: It is the first and the simplest algorithms among hash-based schemes. However, the Lamport scheme is not widely used in practice. Then we analyze the Winternitz scheme, particularly the variant presented in Ref. [12] , which can be considered as a generalization of the Lamport scheme that introduced a size-performance tradeoff. Variations of the Winternitz scheme are used as building blocks in a number of modern hash-based signatures, such as LMS [13] , XMSS [14] , SPHINCS [17] and its improved modifications [15, 16] , as well as applications such as IOTA distributed ledger [18] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we give a short introduction to the scope of hash-based signatures. In Sec. 3, we provide a general scheme of detecting signature forgery event and define a property of the ε-forgery detection availability (ε-FDA). In Sec. 4, we consider the ε-FDA property for the generalized Lamport one-time signature (L-OTS). In Sec. 5, we consider the ε-FDA property for the Winternitz one-time signature (W-OTS + ). We summarize the results of our work in Sec. 6.
Hash-based signatures
Hash-based digital signatures [6, 19] are one of the post-quantum alternatives for currently deployed signature schemes, which has gained a significant deal of interest. The attractiveness of hash-based signatures mostly due to low requirements to construct a secure scheme. Typically, a cryptographic random or pseudorandom number generator is needed, and a function with some or all of preimage, second-preimage, and collision resistance properties, perhaps, in their multi-target variety [11, 15, 20] . Some schemes for hash-based signatures require random oracle assumption [21] to precisely compute their bit security level [22] .
Up to date known quantum attacks based on Grover's algorithm [23] are capable to find a preimage and a collision with time growing sub-exponentially with a length of hash function output [24, 25] . Specifically, it is proven that in the best-case scenario Grover's algorithm gives a quadratic speed-up in a search problem [23, 24] . While this area is a subject of ongoing research and debates [26] [27] [28] , hash-based signatures are considered as resilient against quantum computer attacks. Meanwhile, the overall performance of hash-based digital signatures makes them suitable for the practical use, and several algorithms have been proposed for standardization by NIST (SPHINCS + [15] , Gravity-SPHINCS [16] ) and IETF (LMS [13] , XMSS [14] ).
We note that the hash-based digital signature scheme can be instantiated with any suitable cryptographic hash function. In practice, standardized hash functions, such as SHA, are used for this purpose since they are presumed to satisfy all the necessary requirements. The availability of changing a core cryptographic primitive without a change in the functionality of the whole information security system fits a paradigm of crypto-agility, which is the basic principle of modern security systems development with the built-in possibility of the component replacement.
Proving the fact of a forgery
Here we present a general framework for the investigation of the proof-of-forgery concept. We start our consideration by introducing a generic deterministic digital signature scheme.
Definition 1 (Deterministic digital signature scheme) A deterministic digital signature scheme (DDSS) S = (Kg, Sign, Vf) is a triple of algorithms that allows to perform the following tasks:
is a probabilistic key generation algorithm that outputs a secret key sk, aimed at signing messages, and a public key pk, aimed at checking signatures validity, on input of a security parameter 1 n . -S.Sign(sk, M ) → σ is a deterministic algorithm that outputs a signature σ under secret key sk for a message M . -S.Vf(pk, σ, M ) → v is a verification algorithm that outputs v = 1 if the signature σ of the signed message M is correct under the public key pk, and v = 0 otherwise.
We note that the deterministic property of the DDSS is defined by the fact that for a given pair (sk, M ) the algorithm S.Sign(sk, M ) always generates the same output.
Signer S Adversary A Receiver R Step 0 sk, pk pk pk Table 1 . Message-signature pairs and keys available to involved parties on each step of the scenario, where the adversary A makes a successful CMA obtaining a signature σ for some message M , and forges a signature σ for some new message M = M under the public key pk of the signer S. However, the signer S is able to construct the corresponding proof-of-forgery message E in order to convince the receiver R that the forgery event happened. Square brackets correspond to the optional message-signature transmission.
The standard security requirement for digital signature schemes is their existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (EU-CMA). The chosen message attack setting allows the adversary to choose a set of messages that a legitimate user has to sign. Then the existential unforgeability property means that the adversary should not be able to construct any valid message-signature pair (M , σ ), where the message M is not previously signed by a legitimate secret key holder. EU-CMA is usually proven under the assumption that the adversary is not able to solve some classes of mathematical problems, such as integer factorization, discrete logarithm problem, or inverting a cryptographic hash function.
In the present work, we consider a case where this assumption is not fulfilled. We also restrict ourself with considering one-time signatures only, therefore, a legitimate user can sign only a single message with his secret key. The generalization for the many-time signature schemes can be obtained in a rather straightforward way.
Let us discuss the following scenario involving three parties: An honest legitimate signer S, an honest receiver R, and an adversary A. At the beginning (step 0) we assume that S posses a pair (sk, pk) ← S.Kg, while R and A have a public key pk of S, and they have no any information about corresponding secret key sk (see Table 1 ).
At step 1 A forces S to sign a message M of A's choice. In the result, A obtains a valid message-signature pair (M, σ). At this step, R may or may not know about the fact of signing M by S.
Then at step 2 A performs an existential forgery by producing a new message-signature pair (M , σ ) with M = M . Below we introduce a formal definition of the signature forgery and specify two different cases.
Definition 2 (Signature forgery and its types) A signature σ is called a forged signature of the message M under the public key pk and the signature scheme S if S.Vf(pk, σ , M ) → 1, where the message M has not been signed by the legitimate sender possessing secret key sk corresponding to pk. The following two cases are possible.
-A pair (M , σ ) is called a forgery of type I if the signature σ has been previously generated by the legitimate user a signature for some message other than M . That is, there is a message M with S.Sign(sk, M ) → σ previously signed by a legitimate user. -A pair (M , σ ) is called a forgery of type II if the signature σ has not been previously generated by the legitimate user. That is, there has not been a message with signature σ , signed by the legitimate user.
We note that there is also another scenario of attack, corresponding to the strong unforgeability property [29] , where A is interested in constructing a new valid signature for a message that has been previously signed by the legitimate sender, that is with M = M and σ = σ. However, the consideration of this kind of forgery is beyond the scope of the present paper. The type I forgery can take place if the signature algorithm S.Sign calculates a digest of an input message, and then computes a signature of the corresponding digest. In this case, the adversary A may find a collision of the digest function, and then force the legitimate user to sign a first colliding message by using it as M , and automatically obtain a valid signature for the second colliding message (use it as M ).
An example of type II forgery is the reconstruction of the sk from pk using an efficient algorithm (in analogy to the use of the Shor's algorithm on a quantum computer for the RSA scheme). We note that in our consideration it is assumed that the only way for the adversary A to forge the signature for M is to employ advanced mathematical algorithms and/or unexpectedly powerful computational resources. In other words, we do not consider any side channel attacks or other forms of secret key "stealing", such as social engineering and others.
Coming back to the considered scenario, at the step 2, A sends a pair (M , σ ) to R claiming that M was originally signed by S. If the signature is successfully forged by the adversary A, then this could be the end of the story: The signature scheme is hijacked.
However, we suggest accomplishing this scenario by the following next steps. At the step 3, R sends a message (M , σ ) directly to S in order to request an additional confirmation. Then S observes a valid signature σ of the corresponding message M , which was not generated by him. The concrete issue we address in the present work is whether S is able to prove the fact of a forgery event. Here we formally introduce a proof-of-forgery concept, which is mathematical evidence that someone cheats with signatures by employing computational resources or advanced mathematical algorithms.
Definition 3 (Proof-of-forgery of type I)
A set E = (pk, σ , M, M ) is called a proof-of-forgery of type I (PoF-I) for a DDSS S if for M = M there is a valid signature σ for these two messages, i.e. the following relations hold:
Obviously, if the adversary A performs the type I forgery, then S is able to prove this fact by demonstrating M to R at step 4. Thus, S and R have the complete PoF-I set E = (pk, σ , M, M ), and they are sure that someone has an ability to find signature collisions, which is typically beyond the consideration in standard computational hardness assumptions. Moreover, they can use the set E to prove the fact of the forgery event to any third party since E contains a public key pk. We also note that it is possible to prove the fact of a forgery of type I for any DDSS. The situation in the PoF-II case is more complicated.
Definition 4 (Proof-of-forgery of type II)
A set E = (pk, σ , σ , M ) is called a proof-of-forgery of type II (PoF-II) for a DDSS S if for a message M there are distinct valid signatures σ = σ , i.e. the following relations hold:
The ability of the adversary A to perform a forgery of type II depends on a particular deterministic signature scheme S. Suppose that A has succeeded in obtaining sk from pk (e.g. by using Shor's algorithm and RSA-like scheme), then it is impossible for S to convince R that (M , σ ) was not generated by S. However, if the adversary A has succeeded in obtaining a valid, but different secret key sk = sk, then the legitimate sender S is able to construct the corresponding PoF-II set by calculating Sign(sk, M ) → σ with σ = σ .
As we show below this scenario is the case for properly designed hash-based signatures. We consider particular examples of Lamport and Winternitz one-time signatures schemes. We show that under favourable circumstances S's signature σ of the corresponding message M is different from A's signature σ , and S can send it as part of PoF-II to R at step 4. Thus, the PoF-II set is successfully constructed, so legitimate parties are aware of the break of the used DDSS.
Here, we introduce a definition of a signature schemes property, which allows proving their forgery.
Definition 5 (ε-forgery detection availability) ε-forgery detection availability (ε-FDA) for a one-time DDSS S is defined by the following experiment. Experiment Exp
Let (M, σ) be the query-answer pair of Sign(sk, ·). Return 1 iff S.Sign(sk, M ) → σ , S.Vf(pk, σ , M ) → 1, and M = M . Then the DSS scheme S has ε-FDA if there is no adversary A that succeeds with probability ≥ ε.
Remark 1 In our consideration, we implicitly assume that the parties are able to communicate with each other via authentic channels, e.g. when R sends a request to S at step 3. One can see that in order to enable the detection of the forgery event, the authenticity of the channel should be provided with some different primitives rather than employed signatures. For example, one can use message authentication codes (MACs), which can be based on information-theoretical secure algorithms and symmetric keys.
Remark 2 In the considered scheme honest users only become aware of the fact of forgery event. However, the scheme does not allow determining who exactly in this scenario has such powerful computational capabilities. Indeed, S is not sure whether the signature σ is forged by R or by A. That is why it is advisable for S also to send an evidence E to A as well. At the same time, R is not sure, who is the original author of σ . It is a possible case that S has forged its own signature (say, obtained two messages M and M with a same signature σ = σ ), and sent a message M to A, who then just forwarded it R. It may be in the interest for a malicious S to reveal M at a right moment and claim that it was a forgery.
ε-FDA for Lamport signatures
Here we start with a description of a generalized Lamport single bit one-time DDSS. Consider a cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n , which satisfies the random-oracle assumption [21] . It means that each new unique query to H can be effectively considered as a sampling of a uniformly random bit string from {0, 1}
n . The (n, δ)-Lamport one-time signature ((n, δ)-L-OTS) scheme for single bit message M ∈ {0, 1} has the following construction.
-Key pair generation algorithm ((sk, pk) ← (n, δ)-L-OTS.Kg). The algorithm generates secret and public keys in a form (sk 0 , sk 1 ) and (pk 0 , pk 1 ), with
n+δ and pk i := H(sk i ) (see Fig. 2 ). Here and after $ ← stands for uniformly random sampling from a given set. The security of the (n, δ)-L-OTS scheme is based on the fact that in order to forge a signature for a bit M it is required to invert the used one-way function H for a part of the public key pk M , that is traditionally assumed to be computationally infeasible.
In our work, we particularly stress the importance of inequality between space sizes of secret keys and public keys. Specifically, we demonstrate that for sufficiently large δ even if an adversary finds a correct preimage sk M , such that H(sk M ) = pk M , the obtained value is different from the original sk M used for calculating pk M by the legitimate user. Then the signature of an honest user is different from a forged signature, and so the forgery event can be revealed.
Before turning to the main theorem, we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a function f : {0, 1} n+δ → {0, 1} n with n 1 and δ ≥ 0 which satisfies random-oracle assumption. Let f (x 0 ) = y 0 for some x 0 ∈ {0, 1} n+δ . Define a set
of all preimages of y 0 under f . Consider a randomly taken preimage X $ ← Inv(y 0 ). Then the probability to obtain the original preimage X = x 0 has the following lower and upper bounds:
Proof. Let N := |Inv(y 0 )| be a number of preimages of y 0 under f . Under the random oracle assumption, it is given by N = 1 + N , where N is a random variable having binomial distribution Bin(2 −n , 2 n+δ −1) with the success probability 2 −n and number of trials equal to 2 n+δ − 1. Then the corresponding probability that a randomly chosen element X from Inv(y 0 ) is equal to x 0 is as follows:
In order to obtain the lower bound for Pr(X = x 0 ), we consider only the first term in Eq. (3) and arrive at the following inequality:
where we use the fact that (1 − 2 −n ) 2 n exp(−1) for n 1. This proves part a) of Lemma 1.
In order to obtain the upper bound for Pr(X = x 0 ), we split the sum in Eq. (3) into following two parts:
where N 0 := k2 δ ≥ 1 for some k ∈ (0, 1). The first part can be bounded as follows:
where we use a bound for the cumulative binomial distribution function [30] . For the second part we consider the following bound:
By combining Eq. (6) with Eq. (7) and setting k := 0.36, which corresponds to a minimum of Pr(X = x 0 ), we obtain Pr(X = x 0 ) < 5.22 × 2 −δ . This proves part b) of Lemma 1.
Remark 3
The bound for commutative binomial distribution employed in (6) is rather rough, however, it is quite convenient for the purposes of further discussion. Tighter bound can be obtained, e.g. using the technique from Ref. [31] .
The main result on the FDA property of the (n, δ)-L-OTS scheme can be formulated as follows:
Proof. Consider an adversary successed in forgering a signature σ for message M . From the construction of the signature scheme we have H(σ ) = pk M . According to part b) of the Lemma 1, the probability that the obtained value σ coincides with the original value sk M is bounded by 5.22 × 2 −δ . It follows from the fact that sk M is generated uniformly randomly from the set {0, 1}
n+δ . Therefore, with the probability at least 1 − 5.22 × 2 −δ the legitimate user's signature sk M ← (n, δ)-L-OTS.Sign(sk, M ) is different from the adversary's signature σ and the presence of the forgery event is then proven.
Remark 4
We note that it is extremely important to employ true randomness in the Kg algorithm in order to provide the independence between results of the adversary and the original value of sk. For this purpose, one can use, for example, certified quantum random number generators.
Remark 5
We see that ε-FDA property appears only for high enough values of δ. Meanwhile it follows from part a) of the Lemma 1 that for a common case of δ = 0 the probability for the adversary to obtain the original value sk 1 is at least exp(−1) ≈ 0.368 that is non-negligible.
ε-FDA for the Winternitz Signature Scheme
Here we consider an extension of L-OTS scheme which allows signing messages of L-bit length. We base our approach on a generalization of the Winternitz one-time signature (W-OTS) scheme presented in Ref. [12] , known as W-OTS + , and used in XMSS [20] , SPHINCS [17] and SPHINCS + [15] . We refer our scheme (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS + and construct it as follows.
Let us introduce the parameter ν ∈ {1, 2, . . .} defining blocks length in which a message is split during a signing algorithm, where we assume that L is a multiple of ν. Let us introduce the following auxiliary values:
Then we consider a family of one-way functions:
where i ∈ {1, . . . , w−1} and a parameter r belongs to some domain D. We assume that f (i) r satisfies the random oracle assumption for a uniformly randomly chosen r from D. The employ of this parameter can correspond to XORing the result of some hash function family with a random bit-mask, as it considered in Ref. [12] ).
We then introduce a chain function
r , which we define recursively in the following way:
The algorithms of (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS + scheme are the following: (see Fig. 3 ). Then a public key composed of the randomizing parameter r and results of the chain function employed to sk i as follows:
pk := (r, pk 1 , pk 2 , . . . , pk l ) with pk i := F (w−1) r (sk i ).
-Signature algorithm (σ ← (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS + .Sign(sk, M )). First the algorithm computes base w representation of M by splitting it into ν-bit blocks (M = (m 1 , . . . , m l1 ), where m i ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1}). We call it a message part. Then the algorithm computes a checksum
and its base w representation C = (c 1 , . . . , c l2 ). We call it a checksum part. Define an extended string B = (b 1 , . . . b l ) := M C as the concatenation of message and checksum parts. Finally, the signature is generated as follows:
σ := (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ l ) with σ i := F (bi) r (sk i ).
-Verification algorithm (v ← (n, δ, L, ν)-W-OTS + .Vf(pk, σ, M ))). The idea of the algorithm is to reconstruct a public key from a given signature σ and then to check whether it coincides with original public key pk. First, the Remark 6 One can see that the excess of the preimage space size over the image space size, given by δ, is a crucial condition for the FDA property both for L-OTS and W-OTS + schemes. We also note that in the case of the W-OTS + scheme it is important to have such excess for all the elements of the employed one-way chain.
Conclusion
In this work, we have considered the ε-FDA property of DDSS that allows detecting a forgery event generated be advanced mathematical algorithms and/or unexpectedly powerful computational resources. We have shown that this property is fulfilled for properly-designed hash-based signatures, in particular, for L-OTS and W-OTS + schemes with properly tuned parameters. As we have noted, the probability of the successful demonstration of the DDSS forgery event depends on an excess of preimage space sizes over image space sizes and using true randomness in the generation of secret keys in hash-based DDSS. The important next step is to study this property for other types of hash-based signatures.
Our observation is important in the view of the crypto-agility paradigm. Indeed, the considered forgery detection serves as an alarm that the employed cryptographic hash function has a critical vulnerability and it has to be replaced. The similar concept has been recently considered for detecting brute-force attacks on cryptocurrency wallets in the Bitcoin network [32, 33] .
